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Sentiment shocksThe Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans neoclassical growth setup and the AK endogenous growth framework are two pro-
totypes of a class of growthmodelswhere, by assumption, investment resources are always perfectly allocated to
production. As a corollary, these models offer a partial view of the growth process circumscribed to a limit case,
namely the most favorable case in which all possible frictions on the allocation of investment resources are ab-
sent. This paper adds to the conventional growth setup an optimal mechanism of assignment of investment re-
sources that contemplates the possibility of inefﬁcient allocation. In the assumed economy there is a single
representative investor and a large number ofﬁrms that compete for the available resources. The new setuphigh-
lights how agency costs may deviate the economy from the benchmark growth outcome, potentially generating
less desirable long-run results. The appeal of the proposed framework resides also on the fact that new determi-
nants of growth emerge and take a leading role, namely the investor's sentiment and the quality of the ﬁrms' in-
vestment proposals.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Benchmark growth models offer a partial view on the process of
wealth creation. In such models, no friction on the allocation of invest-
ment is present and, therefore, the economy tends to an upper limit
outcome of full efﬁciency. This paper devises and explores the dynamics
of a stylized optimal control problem concerning the intertemporal
allocation of investment across ﬁrms in a market economy which,
once merged with neoclassical and endogenous growth setups, allows
to gain a wider perspective on the growth process as approached by
standard theory in this ﬁeld of knowledge.
The introduction of a mechanism inducing inefﬁciency on invest-
ment allocation is relevant from an economic growth point of view
because it allows to depart from the implicit setting of full employment
of resources. Departures from potential output are now contemplated,
and they will be determined by a multiplicity of factors, that might
even include animal spirits under the form of the investor's sentiment.
As one will realize, the new structure of analysis is much more amena-
ble to the introduction of a discussion on the compatibility between
business cycles and growth than the conventional growth models.
The proposed setup involves a single representative investor who
decides, based on criteria established at the initial date, how to assign,f an anonymous referee and of
ank the ﬁnancial support of the
te (Grant code: PEst-OE/EGE/
v. Miguel Bombarda 20, 1069-over time, a given amount of ﬁnancial resources. Firms, that exist in
the economy in a potentially large number, will compete for those
resources through the presentation to the investor of projects that detail
the activities they will engage on.
In the described setting, the investment allocation problem acquires
the nature of an agency problem, where the representative investor
plays the role of principal and the ﬁrms are the agents. Because the
investor does not know with anticipation how the assigned budget
will be employed by each ﬁrm, the criteria used to allocate it is the
signaling effort of each ﬁrm; ﬁrms communicate their ﬁnancial needs
to the investor through the presentation of projects that require re-
sources to be prepared.
The allocation of funds involves a matching function between the
quality of the mentioned project proposals and the funds that remain
available to be attributed. This matching is such that both inputs are
essential to obtain a positive outcome: at each speciﬁc time period, no
ﬁnancial transfer will occur if the ﬁrm under consideration does not
present any investment project proposal; likewise, if no funds remain
available, nomatter the quality of the proposed projects, the investment
transfer will not take place. Furthermore, in the model's setting, it
is considered that at each period the investor claims back from
every ﬁrm a constant percentage of the previously allocated funds,
e.g., under the form of contracted capital returns. This forces the ﬁrms
to systematically present new projects since, otherwise, they will
progressively lose the ﬁnancial resources obtained in the past, and
their funding will end up by falling to zero.
The investment allocation problem will be analyzed from the point
of view of theﬁrm. The ﬁrmwill want tomaximize, on an intertemporal
perspective, the difference between the ﬁnancial resources it is capable
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merits of its investment plan. This optimization problemwill be subject
to a budget ﬂow constraint, where the ﬁrm's assigned budget increases
with the already mentioned matching process and diminishes with the
automatic withdrawal of funds at a constant rate.
Although simple in its structure, this is an analytically tractable model
that delivers relevant insights on the process of investment allocation.
Given the signaling costs, this model conducts to a result of inefﬁciency,
in the sense that, in a long-term perspective, the aggregate allocated in-
vestment will remain below 100%. A unique steady-state point is deter-
mined and its position depends decisively on two entities: the quality of
theprojects presentedby theﬁrms and the overall sentiment of the inves-
tor. As these forces shape the amount of aggregate investment, they will
also be main determinants of economic growth.
Project quality and investor sentiment are, according to the available
empirical evidence, two important drivers of the overall aggregate
investment level and of the ability of the economies to generate addi-
tional wealth. Section 2.2 brieﬂy reviews some of the empirical litera-
ture that highlights the key role that each of the two mentioned
features has in what concerns observed growth patterns. This evidence
is the key motivation for setting up the growth model in the sections
that follow. By placing investment in the forefront of the growth analy-
sis one is able to realistically approach long-run wealth accumulation,
without neglecting short-term ﬂuctuations due to changes in the deter-
minants of investment levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a
review of the relevant related literature is undertaken; this review
covers both theoretical contributions and empirical studies that high-
light project quality and investor's sentiment as main drivers of the
growthprocess. Section 3makes the analytical presentation of the prob-
lem of the ﬁrm. Section 4 derives optimality conditions and discusses
the existence of the steady-state. In Section 5, the stability of the long-
term equilibrium is investigated. Section 6 studies how eventual
changes on the values of exogenous variables, including the investor's
sentiment, might disturb transitional dynamics and the steady-state.
In Section 7, the analytical framework of this paper is merged with the
Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model in order to address the respective im-
plications for growth, in a neoclassical perspective. Section 8 adapts
the dynamic resource allocation problem to a setting of endogenous
growth. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2. Related literature
2.1. Theoretical foundations
The analysis in the following sections is inspired by a conﬂuence of
different strands of literature in economics. First, the ﬁnancial literature
that highlights agency relations and other sources of conﬂict between
investors and investment recipients, which typically lead to investment
distortions. Although the studies in turn of this subject tend to be
circumscribed to a unique ﬁrm or group of integrated ﬁrms that under-
take diversiﬁed activities, with themanagerswithin each department or
division negotiating with the shareholders the corresponding
budget allocations, such discussion is straightforward to extrapolate to
our environment of a unique representative investor in the economy.
About agency and power relations within the ﬁrm, with consequences
on the allocation of scarce resources see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny
(1989), La Porta et al. (2000), Rajan et al. (2000), Burkart and Panunzi
(2006), Agliardi and Agliardi (2008), Albuquerque and Wang (2008)
and Chetty and Saez (2010).
The second relevant line of inquiry relates to the extensive literature
that searches for an integrated analysis of growth and business cycles. A
signiﬁcant part of this literature takes conventional growth models and
explores the mechanisms that may induce persistent deviations of
varying amplitude relatively to the full rational/full efﬁcient benchmark
outcome. One notorious contribution in this ﬁeld is the work by Evanset al. (1998), who identify the possibility of formation of two different
balanced growth paths, one respecting to a state of low growth and
the other to a state of high growth. The economy may converge to one
or the other steady-state, depending on the agents' expectations.
Other work on growth cycles puts R&D investment at the center of
the discussion. It is the case of Matsuyama (1999, 2001), Eriksson and
Lindh (2000), Walde (2002, 2005), Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003)
and Shinagawa (2013). These studies emphasize the role of the cyclical
behavior of the investment in innovation, in some cases triggered
by stochastic shocks and in other cases by endogenous processes, in
shaping long-term cyclical growth.
The search for endemic causes of deterministic growth cycles has a
long tradition in economics, starting in the 1980s with the work of
Benhabib and Day (1981), Day (1982), Grandmont (1985) and
Deneckere and Pelikan (1986), among others. Meaningful contributions
on the ﬁeld of endogenous growth cycles include Christiano and
Harrison (1999), who proved the existence of chaos in a standard
deterministic version of the Real Business Cycles (RBC)model with pro-
duction externalities, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), who encoun-
tered rational routes to randomness in a setting of heterogeneous
expectations and discrete choice across distinct deliberation rules,
Boldrin et al. (2001), who address the conditions under which endoge-
nous growth models might generate endogenous cyclical motion,
Gomes (2008), who considers that the non-rival nature of technology
conﬂicts with congestion externalities triggering in this way endoge-
nous ﬂuctuations, and Drugeon (2013), who highlights how a standard
growth model with heterogeneous capital goods may conduct to a re-
sult that departs from stability and give rise to competitive equilibrium
growth cycles that are optimally generated.
In this article, growth cycles are not explicitly modeled, but the
offered framework creates the setting that allows to analyze their pres-
ence. By conceiving an environment where optimal decisions by ratio-
nal agents originate a less than efﬁcient equilibrium result, in the
sense that part of the investment resources will remain unemployed,
one will be able to approach the conditions that lead to low or high
growth (i.e., growth results that depart more or less from the full
efﬁciency benchmark outcome). If one allows for multiple investor's
sentiment states or systematic changes on the quality level of the
projects presented by ﬁrms to the investor, then one will be able to ap-
proach cyclical motion in the presented growth framework.
A third strand of thought with relevance to the study in this paper
concerns the resurgence of animal spirits as a main determinant of the
explanation of short-run aggregate ﬂuctuations. In a typical growth
model, the entities capable of disturbing the generated balanced growth
path are technology, the preferences of consumers and other funda-
mentals. RBC theory is built precisely on this assumption: systematic
changes on the technical conditions of production and other supply
side effects are, under this interpretation, the determinants of observed
ﬂuctuations (see King and Rebelo, 1999; Rebelo, 2005).
Alternative explanations, namely those that place the emphasis on
agents' sentiments or animal spirits, have occasionally appeared in the
literature. Themost popular of these approaches is the one relatingmul-
tiple equilibria and indeterminacy in optimal growth models. The inde-
terminacy or sunspots literature, developed by Azariadis (1981), Cass
and Shell (1983), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Weder (2004) and
Guerrazzi (2012), among others, supports that self-fulﬁlling prophecies
leading to ﬂuctuations might emerge in frictionless economies when
the neoclassical model is modiﬁed in order to display multiple equilib-
ria. Undermultiple equilibria, the beliefs of agents determine the trajec-
tory to be followed from a series of optimal trajectories generated by
economic fundamentals. Indeterminacy implies that there is not a
unique optimal path to follow and, in this case, the trajectory that is
effectively followed depends on the self-fulﬁlling beliefs of the agents.
A revival of animal spirits as a centerpiece of the macroeconomic
thought occurred with the publication of the book by Akerlof and
Shiller (2009), which coincided with the great recession of the end of
1 Although ﬁrms develop different tasks, we consider these to be perfect substitutes
and, thus, a perfectly competitive market environment is considered. This assumption is
useful later on the paper, when addressing the impact of inefﬁcient investment allocation
over growth. Alternatively, a monopolistic competition setup could be taken, if the pro-
ductive tasks developed by ﬁrms presented some degree of substitutability. This would
imply considering a Dixit–Stiglitz production functionwhen presenting the growth frame-
work, instead of the Cobb–Douglas function thatwill be assumed. There are nomeaningful
differences, in terms of the model's implications, of assuming one or the other
speciﬁcation.
74 O. Gomes / Economic Modelling 50 (2015) 72–84theﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century. In the book, the view that in-
dividual sentiments matter for economic outcomes was emphasized,
leading to a new wave of interest on the impact of agents' sentiments
over economic results.
In the work that followed, two studies deserve to be highlighted.
First, De Grauwe (2011), who claims that rational expectations and
animal spirits do not mix well and, thus, considers the presence of cog-
nitive deﬁciencies in theway individuals process information. This does
not mean that agents are irrational; instead, they are rational in under-
standing that they have a limited capacity to interpret reality and, there-
fore, have to use simple heuristics to take decisions. De Grauwe's model
generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism that might be
associated to the notion of animal spirits.
On a different plan, Angeletos and La'O (2013) propose a framework
of analysis that combines market sentiments or animal spirits with the
paradigm of rational expectations, as in the sunspots analysis. Differently
from the sunspots setup, though, in the mentioned article multiple equi-
libria are absent. The sentiments of agents emerge as the outcomeof com-
munication constraints. The authors prove that if the communication is
random and decentralized, business cycles might arise in the context of
a typical neoclassical model, independently of shocks to fundamentals.
It is the propagation of information that generates, in this case, endoge-
nous ﬂuctuations based on waves of optimism and pessimism.
In our article, there are evident departures relatively to the previous
contributions, but a relevant role is, in the same way, assigned to senti-
ments, namely investor sentiments. Shocks on the conﬁdence level of
the representative investor will imply different rates of utilization of
the resources available to generate value, implying potential ﬂuctua-
tions on the level of aggregate output.
In what concerns the particular modeling apparatus used in this
paper, it has antecedents on Gomes (2014, 2015), where inefﬁciency
due to agency relations is applied, respectively, to resource allocation
in the brain and consequent cognitive decisions of the individual agent,
and to a problem of budget setting within the divisions of a given ﬁrm.
2.2. A remark on the empirics of project quality and investor's sentiment
In the introduction, it was highlighted that the quality of investment
projects and the investor's sentimentwill be themain drivers of growth
in the analysis to pursue in the sections that follow. Besides this being an
intuitive fact, there is also plenty evidence in the economics literature
pointing to the relevance of these elements as forces that decisively
shape long-term growth trajectories.
Concerning project quality, one should start by noting that this is not
a concept completely void of ambiguity. From a strictlyﬁnancial point of
view, the feasibility of a project is measured by its return in terms of
expected cash-ﬂows, but many other dimensions are relevant to assess
investment quality from an economic growth point of view; the envi-
ronmental impact or the expected society-wide externalities, positive
and negative, for instance, are two features that must be taken into
account as well.
Independently of the considered deﬁnition, the idea that the quality
of investment projects is a key determinant of growth ﬁnds in the empir-
ical literature strong substantiation. This is, for instance, the result point-
ed out by Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2002), who have assessed the
growth performance of Middle-East countries. The authors claim that
the persistent low growth in this region of the globe is the direct conse-
quence ofwrong or inefﬁcient investment choices, which have their pro-
found roots on several infra-structural deﬁciencies, namely the poor
quality of institutions (ﬁnancial, political, educational and others).
The discussion on the quality of investment projects is most of the
times associated with, on one hand, public investment and, on the other
hand, foreign direct investment. Gupta et al. (2014) and O'Toole and
Tarp (2014) address the issue of public investment efﬁciency, mainly in
the perspective of the development of low-income economies. The men-
tioned studies stress that measures of the adequacy of public investmentprojects are a statistically signiﬁcant variable when explaining growth in
developing countries. Furthermore, public authorities should be con-
cerned with suppressing rent-seeking behavior, bureaucracy and corrup-
tion, since these are sources of inefﬁciency in the allocation of capital,
leading to poor quality projects, and thus impair growth.
The notion of investment quality is also present on how the impact
of capital ﬂows from abroad is assessed. Alfaro and Charlton (2007)
highlight the idea that some types of foreign direct investment are pref-
erable than others; these authors associate the notion of foreign invest-
ment quality to the effect that such investment has on growth in the
host country. In the same vein, Beckaert et al. (2011) demonstrate
that the openness to capital ﬂows from abroad typically enhances
investment efﬁciency and increases the quality of the investment pro-
jects in the economy; and this is positively and strongly correlated
with aggregate output growth.
A second strong claim in our analysis is that the investor's sentiment
is a main driver of the aggregate investment ﬂows that determine the
pace of growth. This is documented, for instance, in the study by Arif
and Lee (2014), who evaluate the relation between the sentiment of
investors, the expected equity returns and the level of aggregate invest-
ment; not surprisingly, they conclude that periods when sentiments of
optimism dominate are also periods in which the investment of ﬁrms
reaches the highest observable levels. Montone and Zwinkels (2015)
also arrive to the conclusion that investor sentiments have real effects;
speciﬁcally, these authors discuss the correlation between the senti-
ment of capital owners and the growth of employment and output.
Another piece of evidence on the relation between investor conﬁ-
dence and growth is provided by Milani (2014), who estimates a mac-
roeconomic general equilibrium model and ﬁnds evidence that
psychological factors, namely those related to investment decisions,
are a main determinant of the observable aggregate business cycles
(they are responsible, according to this study, by more than 40% of the
observable business ﬂuctuations, in the United States).
3. The dynamic resource allocation problem
Consider an economy populated by a single representative investor
and a large number of ﬁrms, each one dedicated to the development
of a speciﬁc productive task i ∈ N.1 Firms compete for the available
investment resources, which the representative investor allocates, at
each date t ≥ 0, after evaluating two criteria: (i) the signaling effort of
each ﬁrm and (ii) the investment resources that remain available to
assign.
Two arrays of endogenous variables play a role in themodel: the in-
vestment shares allocated to the activities of each ﬁrm, ωi(t), and the
costs ﬁrms incur when presenting their projects to the capital holder,
ϕi(t), which are alsomeasured as percentages of the available investor's
budget. Variables ωi(t) and ϕi(t) correspond to non-negative values
∀ t ≥ 0, and the respective aggregate levels cannot assume values larger
than the unity, i.e., Ω(t) ≡ ∫i ∈ N ωi(t)di ≤ 1 and Φ(t) ≡ ∫i ∈ N ϕi(t)di ≤ 1.
The objective of each ﬁrm is to maximize, in an intertemporal per-
spective, the difference between the collected amount of investment
and the signaling costs associated with their acquisition. In this setting,
variable ϕi(t) acquires the role of control variable, i.e., the ﬁrm is free to
choose howmuch it commits to acquire the funds thatwill serve the de-
velopment of productive activities, in order to fulﬁll the referred
4 The optimality conditions hold under the presumption that the constraints over vari-
ablesωi(t) ≥ 0, ϕi(t) ≥ 0, andΩ(t) ≤ 1,Φ(t) ≤ 1 are not violated. As the analytical study un-
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count rate, ρ N 0, the objective function of ﬁrm i is,2
Ui 0ð Þ ¼ Maxϕi tð Þ
Z þ∞
0
ωi tð Þ−ϕi tð Þ½ exp −ρtð Þdt; i ∈N: ð1Þ
A law of motion that is beyond the control of each ﬁrm will deter-
mine the evolution over time of the assigned investment share, ωi(t);
this is the state variable of the problem. Two processeswork in opposite
directions. The ﬁrst process, through which the allocated investment
share potentially increases, is generated by a matching function that
puts into confrontation the ﬁrm's signaling effort and the resources
the investor has left to be allocated at date t.
Deﬁnition 1. Matching function
Function fi[ϕi(t), 1− Ω(t)] : ℝ+2 → ℝ+ is a matching function of the
ﬁrm's dynamic investment allocation problem if it obeys the following
properties:
i) fi is a continuous and differentiable function;
ii) fi is increasing in both arguments: ∂fi/∂ϕi N 0, ∂fi/∂(1− Ω) N 0;
iii) fi is subject to decreasing marginal returns: ∂2fi/∂ϕi2 b 0,
∂2fi/∂(1− Ω)2 b 0;
iv) fi is homogeneous of degree 1: fi[ϵϕi(t), ϵ(1 − Ω(t))] =
ϵfi[ϕi(t), 1 − Ω(t)], ∀ ϵ N 0;
v) Both inputs are essential for the matching process,
fi[0, 1− Ω(t)] = fi[ϕi(t), 0] = 0.
A possible explicit functional form for the matching function, that
obeys the above properties, is a Cobb–Douglas function of the type,
f i ϕi tð Þ;1−Ω tð Þ½  ¼ B qiϕi tð Þ½ β 1−Ω tð Þ½ 1−β; i ∈N;B N0; qiN0;β ∈ 0;1ð Þ:
ð2Þ
Three parameters play a role in function (2); β is an elasticity param-
eter, B is a measure of the investor's sentiment (a stronger positive
sentiment implies a more efﬁcient matching), and qi represents the
quality of the projects ﬁrm i proposes to the investor. The quality
parameter is not necessarily of a same value across ﬁrms, meaning
that they are heterogeneous regarding the ability to convince the inves-
tor inﬁnancing the respective activities. Note that parameter qi emerges
in the matching function as a weight over the signaling costs; this
signiﬁes that the input of the matching function is not just the cost
incurred by the ﬁrm to communicate investment plans; the effective-
ness of the communication is relevant as well.
The second force shaping the pace of the investment share respects
to an automatic withdrawal of resources by the investor, who claims
back, at each time period, a constant percentage of the attributed
funds. This allows the investor to continuously hold ﬁnancial resources
in search for the best investment opportunities, and compels ﬁrms, in
order to maintain or increase their budgets, to present, systematically
over time, new projects to the investor. If no effort is made by the
ﬁrm to acquire resources, i.e., ifϕi(t)= 0, then the ﬁrmwill lose allocat-
ed resources at a rate ζ ∈ (0, 1).
Under the speciﬁed conditions, the resource constraint takes the
form3
ω

i tð Þ ¼ f i ϕi tð Þ;1−Ω tð Þ½ −ζωi tð Þ; i ∈N;ωi 0ð Þ ¼ ωi0 ∈ 0;1ð Þ given: ð3Þ2 The discount rate indicates the degree of impatience of ﬁrm i concerning future net
budget allocation. A value of ρ close to zero implies a low level of impatience; if ρ is high,
the future is heavily discounted and the agent is highly impatient. In order to simplify the
analysis, one considers that the discount rate is identical across ﬁrms.
3 Note that the model's formulation is purely deterministic and that perfect foresight
holds for every assumed dynamic relation.Deﬁnition 2. DRAP
The dynamic resource allocation problem (DRAP) faced by ﬁrm i
consists in solving Eq. (1) subject to Eq. (3) and to the constraints on
variables ωi(t) ≥ 0, ϕi(t) ≥ 0, and Ω(t) ≤ 1, Φ(t) ≤ 1.
4. Optimal solution and the steady-state
The solution of the DRAP will be a system of dynamic equations
reﬂecting the motion of the investment shares and of the respective
co-state variable, pi(t) ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution of the DRAP, for the Cobb–Douglas
matching function, corresponds to the system of differential equations
ω

i tð Þ ¼ B1= 1−βð Þ βqipi tð Þ½ β= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ −ζωi tð Þ; i ∈N ð4Þ
p

i tð Þ ¼ ρþ ζð Þpi tð Þ−1
þ 1−βð Þββ= 1−βð ÞB1= 1−βð Þ
Z
j ∈ N
qβ= 1−βð Þj p j tð Þ1= 1−βð Þ
h i
dj; i ∈N:
ð5Þ
Proof. The current-value Hamiltonian function of the optimal control
DRAP is, for a ﬁrm i,
H ϕi tð Þ;ωi tð Þ;pi tð Þ½  ¼ ωi tð Þ−ϕi tð Þ
þ
Z
j ∈ N
pj tð Þ B qjϕ j tð Þ
h iβ
1−Ω tð Þ½ 1−β−ζω j tð Þ
 
dj; i∈N:
ð6Þ
Applying Pontryagin's principle, the computation of ﬁrst-order opti-
mality conditions yields,4
∂H
∂ϕi tð Þ
¼ 0⇒ ϕi tð Þ ¼ qβ= 1−βð Þi βBpi tð Þ½ 1= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ ; i ∈N ð7Þ
p

i tð Þ ¼ ρpi tð Þ−
∂H
∂ωi tð Þ
⇒
p

i tð Þ ¼ ρþ ζð Þpi tð Þ−1þ 1−βð ÞB
Z
j ∈N
pj tð Þ
qjϕ j tð Þ
1−Ω tð Þ
 β( )
dj; i ∈N
ð8Þ
and the transversality condition for inﬁnite horizon problems, which is,
in this case,
lim
t→þ∞
pi tð Þexp −ρtð Þωi tð Þ ¼ 0; i ∈N: ð9Þ
To determine the rule of motion of the co-state variable, Eq. (5), just
replace ϕi(t), as deﬁned by Eq. (7), into the ﬁrst-order condition Eq. (8):
p

i tð Þ ¼ ρþ ζð Þpi tð Þ−1
þ 1−βð ÞB
Z
j ∈N
pj tð Þ
qj q
β= 1−βð Þ
j βBpj tð Þ
h i1= 1−βð Þ
1−Ω tð Þ½ 
 
1−Ω tð Þ
2
664
3
775
β8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
dj; i∈N⇔
p

i tð Þ ¼ ρþ ζð Þpi tð Þ−1þ 1−βð ÞB
Z
j ∈ N
pj tð Þ βBqjp j tð Þ
h iβ= 1−βð Þ 
dj; i ∈N⇔
p

i tð Þ ¼ ρþ ζð Þpi tð Þ−1þ 1−βð Þββ= 1−βð ÞB1= 1−βð Þ
Z
j ∈ N
qβ= 1−βð Þj p j tð Þ1= 1−βð Þ
h i
dj; i ∈N:folds, one will conﬁrm that the constraints are satisﬁed for any t ≥ 0, whenever the
following set of conditions apply:
(i) The initial state of the system locates in the vicinity of the system's steady-state;
(ii) Ω(0) b Ω∗, with Ω∗ the steady-state value of Ω(t);
(iii) The steady-state value of the co-state variable, p∗, obeys constraint 2β−1β
1
ρþζ ≤p
b
1
ρþζ if βN
1
2 or 0bp
b 1ρþζ if β≤
1
2.
Fig. 1. Steady-state uniqueness for the co-state variable.
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substituting ϕi(t), as in Eq. (7), into the constraint Eq. (3):
ω

i tð Þ ¼ B qi qβ= 1−βð Þi βBpi tð Þ½ 1= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ 
n oh iβ
1−Ω tð Þ½ 1−β−ζωi tð Þ⇔
ω

i tð Þ ¼ B βBqipi tð Þ½ β= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ −ζωi tð Þ⇔
ω

i tð Þ ¼ B1= 1−βð Þ βqipi tð Þ½ β= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ −ζωi tð Þ:
The pair of differential Eqs. (4)–(5) is a deterministic two-
dimensional dynamic system with two endogenous variables. A ﬁrst
step in the process of evaluating this system's dynamics consists in
assessing the properties of the steady-state.
Deﬁnition 3. Steady-state
The steady-state of theDRAP is the pointðωi ; pi Þ ¼ fðωi ; pi Þ : ω

iðtÞ ¼
0; p

iðtÞ ¼ 0; i ∈Ng.
Given the deﬁnition of the steady-state for the problem under
consideration, the following result is accomplished,
Proposition 2. The steady-state point of the DRAP, (ωi∗, pi∗), i ∈ N, exists
and it is unique.
Proof. Applying condition ṗi(t) = 0 to equation of motion Eq. (5),
1−βð Þββ= 1−βð ÞB1= 1−βð Þ
Z
j ∈N
qβ= 1−βð Þj p

j
 1= 1−βð Þ 
dj ¼ 1− ρþ ζð Þpi :
ð10Þ
Observe that the lhs of expression Eq. (10) is the same independent-
ly of the ﬁrm forwhich the optimality problem is approached. An imme-
diate corollary of this observation is that pi∗= pj∗,∀ i, j ∈N. In the light of
this result, deﬁne p∗≡pi∗, ∀ i ∈ N, and rewrite Eq. (10) as
1−βð Þββ= 1−βð Þ Bpð Þ1= 1−βð Þ
Z
j ∈N
qβ= 1−βð Þj dj ¼ 1− ρþ ζð Þp: ð11Þ
Expression Eq. (11) does not allow for the determination of an
explicit solution for the steady-state level of the co-state variable. How-
ever, it is straightforward to verify that this steady-state value exists and
is unique. Begin by observing that the rhs of Eq. (11) is a straight line
starting at 1 (for p∗ = 0) and possessing a negative slope; while the
lhs is an increasing convex function of p∗ starting at 0 (for p∗ = 0).
Given the shape of the two mentioned functions, they will intersect in
a single point for p ∈ð0; 1ρþζÞ.
To complete the proof, one needs to demonstrate that ωi∗ exists and
is unique as well. Solvingω

iðtÞ ¼ 0, given Eq. (4), the following relation
emerges,
1−Ω ¼ ζω

i
B1= 1−βð Þ βqipi
 	β= 1−βð Þ ð12Þ
with Ω∗≡∫j ∈ N ωj∗dj. Because the steady-state value of the co-state
variable is identical across ﬁrms, Eq. (12) implies that, for any i, j ∈ N,
ωi
ωj
¼ qi
q j
 !β= 1−βð Þ
: ð13Þ
Relation Eq. (13) allows for rewritingΩ∗, given the respective deﬁni-
tion,
Ω ¼ 1
qiβ= 1−βð Þ
Z
j ∈N
qβ= 1−βð Þj djω

i : ð14ÞReplacingΩ∗, as displayed in Eq. (14), into Eq. (12), the steady-state
of variable ωi(t) is given as
ωi ¼
B1= 1−βð Þ βqipð Þβ= 1−βð Þ
B1= 1−βð Þ βpð Þβ= 1−βð Þ
Z
j ∈N
qβ= 1−βð Þj djþ ζ
; i ∈N: ð15Þ
Since there is a unique p∗, expression Eq. (15) guarantees that a
unique ωi∗ exists as well. Nevertheless, note that ωi∗ is different across
ﬁrms, given the different quality of the projects presented to the
investor.
Several elements in the proof of Proposition 2 deserve a comment.
First, one can visualize the steady-state outcome for the co-state
variable through the graphical representation of the lhs and of the rhs
of Eq. (10). The intersection point delivers p∗ as depicted in Fig. 1.
Second, note that the mechanics of the model impose an indisput-
able upper bound on the value of p∗; one has stated, in Footnote 4,
that this upper bound is required to guarantee that boundaries on the
values of variables are respected. In fact, such upper bound does not
need to be forced into the model, since it arises spontaneously. One
will get back to this issue later when directly exploring the feasibility
conditions of the model. A third point relates to Eq. (13). One should
highlight that it delivers a relevant result: it states that in the long
term steady-state the single determinant of the difference between
investment shares allocated across ﬁrms is the quality of project
signaling.
A last remark is associated with steady-state result (Eq. (15)). One
can use this to obtain the expression of the aggregate investment
share, also evaluated in the steady-state. Summing across all ωi∗,
Ω ¼
B1= 1−βð Þ βpð Þβ= 1−βð Þ
Z
i ∈N
qβ= 1−βð Þi di
B1= 1−βð Þ βpð Þβ= 1−βð Þ
Z
i ∈ N
qβ= 1−βð Þi diþ ζ
: ð16Þ
Share Ω∗ can be represented, in an alternative form, once one
combines Eqs. (16) and (11),
Ω ¼ 1− ρþ ζð Þp

1− ρþ βζð Þp : ð17Þ
It is evident, both from Eqs. (16) and (17), that Ω∗ b 1. This result is
important because it indicates that no matter the efﬁciency of the
investment allocation process, the agency relation that is established
between the investor and the ﬁrms will prevent investment resources
to be fully allocated. Naturally, allocation results improve with a better
quality of the investment project proposals or with a more optimistic
investor sentiment, as one will conﬁrm with the formal analysis in
Section 6; however, independently of the values of B and qi, there will
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under the mechanics of the proposed dynamic model.
Another steady-state result is the one respecting the control
variable. The evaluation of Eq. (7) in the steady-state, given the relation
between p∗ and Ω∗ in expression Eq. (16), yields
ϕi ¼
1−βð Þζ βBð Þ1= 1−βð Þ pð Þ 2−βð Þ= 1−βð Þqβ= 1−βð Þi
1− ρþ βζð Þp : ð18Þ
Note that, according to Eq. (18), the steady-state of the signaling cost
variable differs across ﬁrms, given the difference in the quality of the
proposed investment projects. For any i, j ∈ N,
ϕi
ϕj
¼ qi
q j
 !β= 1−βð Þ
: ð19Þ
As for the budget share variable, the steady-state signaling cost
incurred by ﬁrm i relatively to the signaling cost incurred by ﬁrm j is
as much larger as the wider is the difference in terms of the quality of
the investment projects.
The steady-state value of the aggregate level of the signaling costs
across ﬁrms is obtainable directly from Eq. (18),
Φ ¼
Z
i ∈ N
ϕi di ¼ βζpΩ: ð20Þ
5. Local stability
In this section, transitional dynamics of the DRAP are evaluated. A
point (ωi0, pi0) in the vicinity of (ωi∗, pi∗) is considered and local stability
is approached through the linearization of the system of Eqs. (4)–(5).
The linearization process requires the computation of the correspond-
ing Jacobian matrix, which can be partitioned in four distinct blocks,
J ¼ J11 J12J21 J22
 
:
Matrix Jmn,m= 1, 2, n= 1, 2, will contain, as elements, the deriva-
tives of each differential equation with respect to each variable, duly
evaluated in the steady-state. In matrix Jmn, one ﬁnds the derivatives
of the state equations (m = 1) or of the co-state equations (m = 2)
with respect to each state variable (n=1) or co-state variable (n=2).
The computation of the elements of the Jacobianmatrixwill allow for
the characterization of the stability properties of the dynamic system.
Proposition 3. The DRAP, when evaluated in the steady-state vicinity,
delivers a saddle-path stable equilibrium, with the number of stable
trajectories equal to the number of productive tasks (i.e., the number
of ﬁrms).
Proof. Local stability is approachable by computing the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix. Stable and unstable dimensions have correspon-
dence on the signs of the eigenvalues. Speciﬁcally, to each negative
(positive) eigenvalue, it corresponds a stable (unstable) dimension of
the model.
Note that the Jacobian matrix is a square matrix of order equal to
twice the number of ﬁrms or productive tasks. The Jacobian matrix
will contain a number of eigenvalues equal to thematrix order. These ei-
genvalues are straightforward to compute because J21 is a matrix of
zeros.5 In this case, the eigenvalues of J are necessarily the eigenvalues
of matrices J11 and J22; hence, the contents of J12 are not relevant for
the purpose at hand, and one does not need to calculate them.5 Equations relating the co-state variables dependon this variables alone, andnot on the
state variables.Matrix J11 has, as elements in the main diagonal, the following,
~jii ¼ −
1−
Z
j ∈ N if g
ωjd j
1−
Z
j ∈ N
ωj dj
ζ :
Outside the main diagonal, the elements are
~ji‘ ¼ −
ωi
1−
Z
j ∈ N
ωj dj
ζ :
Relatively to matrix J22, the respective elements are, in the main
diagonal,
~jii ¼ ρþ
1−
Z
j∈Nn if g
ωj d j
1−
Z
j ∈ N
ωj dj
ζ :
Outside the main diagonal of J22,
~ji‘ ¼ −
ω‘

1−
Z
j ∈ N
ωj dj
ζ :
For matrix J11, one of the eigenvalues is
λi ¼ − 1
1−
Z
j ∈N
ωj d j
ζ :
All the others are identical,
λ j ¼ −ζ ; j∈N if g:
A similar result is obtained for J22,
λi ¼ ρþ
1
1−
Z
j ∈ N
ωj dj
ζ
and
λ j ¼ ρþ ζ ; j∈N if g:
Direct observation indicates that the eigenvalues of J11 are all nega-
tive and that the eigenvalues of J22 are all positive. Therefore, the system
is saddle-path stablewith stable and unstable spaces possessing an iden-
tical dimension. The dimensionality of both the stable and the unstable
trajectories is equal to the number of ﬁrms that compete for the invest-
ment resources. Therefore, there exists a saddle-point equilibrium,
with this point having a dimensionality equal to the number of ﬁrms.
To address transitional dynamics, one needs to compute the analyt-
ical expressions of the stable trajectories through which the endoge-
nous variables converge to the long-term equilibrium point. A ﬁrst
relevant result involves the (absence of)motion of the co-state variable.
Proposition 4. In the convergence towards the steady-state, the co-
state variable assumes the constant value pi(t) = p∗.
Proof. For a given ﬁrm i, the stable trajectory respecting to the co-state
variable pi(t) is given by the following general expression,
pi tð Þ−p ¼
Z
j ∈N
Z
‘∈N
χp‘iχ
ω;−1
j‘ d‘

 
ω j tð Þ−ωj
h i 
dj; i ∈N ð21Þ
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Ξp is the sub-matrix of the matrix of eigenvectors of the Jacobian J
that is associated to the negative eigenvalues and that respects to the
co-state variables;Ξω−1 is the inverse of the sub-matrix of the samema-
trix of eigenvectors that respects to the state variables. Thematrix of ei-
genvectors concerning negative eigenvalues is Ξ ¼ ½Ξω Ξp 0.
Taking into consideration the eigenvalues of J, the following
outcome is obtained: Ξp ¼ 0, i.e., all elements χ‘ip are null values. This
implies that expression (21) reduces to pi(t) = p∗, ∀ i ∈ N, meaning
that in the convergence to the steady-state following the stable trajecto-
ry, the co-state variable is initially placed at point pi0 = p∗ and remains
there as variable ωi(t) converges towards its long-term value.
The result in Proposition 4 simpliﬁes signiﬁcantly the analysis of the
DRAP, since one can focus solely on the movement of ωi(t). In the
adjustment to the steady-state, Eq. (4) becomes a linear equation,
ω

i tð Þ ¼ B1= 1−βð Þ βqipð Þβ= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ −ζωi tð Þ; i ∈N ð22Þ
that, under steady-state conditions, is equivalent to
ω

i tð Þ ¼
ζωi
1−Ω
1−Ω tð Þ½ −ζωi tð Þ; i ∈N: ð23Þ
The solution of Eq. (23) for the set of all productive tasks i is,
ω ¼ ω þΞωexp Λtð ÞΞ−1ω ω0−ωð Þ: ð24Þ
In expression (24), ω is the vector of state variables ωi(t), i ∈ N; ω0
and ω∗ are the respective vectors of initial values and steady-state
values. Matrix Ξω is the matrix of eigenvectors of J11 and Ξω−1 its
inverse, as deﬁned above; Λ is the Jordan matrix of the system, i.e., it
is a matrix with the system's eigenvalues in the main diagonal and
zeros outside the main diagonal.
Proceeding with the respective computation, the system's solution
for each share ωi(t) is derived,
ωi tð Þ ¼ ωi þ
ωi
Ω
exp −
ζ
1−Ω
t

 
−exp −ζtð Þ
 
þ ωi0−ωi
 	
exp −ζtð Þ; i ∈N: ð25Þ
The sum of ωi(t) across the investment shares of all ﬁrms delivers
the trajectory in time of the aggregate investment share Ω(t),6
Ω tð Þ ¼ Ω þ Ω0−Ωð Þexp − ζ1−Ω t

 
: ð26Þ
Next, one proves that the ﬁrst-order conditions in the proof of
Proposition 1 effectively are the relevant optimality conditions of the
problem, under the assumptions that were mentioned in the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 5. Let Ω0 b Ω∗, p(t) = p∗ and
p :
2β−1
β
1
ρþ ζ ≤p
b
1
ρþ ζ if βN
1
2
0bpb
1
ρþ ζ if β≤
1
2
:
8><
>:
Under these conditions, constraints on variables ωi(t) ≥ 0, ϕi(t) ≥ 0,
and Ω(t) ≤ 1, Φ(t) ≤ 1 are satisﬁed, ∀ t ≥ 0.
Proof. The initial value and the steady-state value ofΩ(t) are such that
0 b Ω0 b Ω∗ b 1. Eq. (26) implies Ω(t) = Ω0 for t = 0, Ω(t) = Ω∗ when6 The trajectory of the aggregate investment share (Eq. (26)) could be obtained, as well,
through the determination of the solution of the scalar differential equation respecting
Ω(t), which is Ω
 ðtÞ ¼ − ζ1−Ω ½ΩðtÞ−Ω. This differential equation is obtained directly
from the deﬁnition Ω
 ðtÞ≡∫i∈N ω

iðtÞdi, with ω iðtÞ given by Eq. (23).t→+ ∞, and Ω0 b Ω(t) b Ω∗, for 0 b t b+ ∞. Therefore, it is not possible
to have any value of the aggregate investment share above 1; further-
more, Eq. (25) indicates that ωi(t) must be a non-negative value,
independently of the assumed time moment; to conﬁrm this outcome,
note that Ω0 b Ω∗ by assumption and that expð− ζ1−Ω tÞbexpð−ζtÞ for
any t, thus making the second term of the expression positive; because
the sum of the remaining terms, ωi∗ + (ωi0 − ωi∗)exp(−ζt) must be
positive as well, regardless of t, one also conﬁrms the veracity of
ωi(t) ≥ 0.
Under pi(t) = p∗, expression Eq. (7) is equivalent to
ϕi tð Þ ¼ qβ= 1−βð Þi βBpð Þ1= 1−βð Þ 1−Ω tð Þ½ ; i ∈N: ð27Þ
The control variable is, according to Eq. (27), a non-negative value.
Finally, the sum of ϕi(t) as presented in Eq. (27), and given the steady-
state relations, takes the form
Φ tð Þ ¼ β
1−β
1− ρþ ζð Þp½  1−Ω tð Þ½ : ð28Þ
In Eq. (28), Ω(t) may assume any value between 0 and 1. Therefore,
conditionΦ(t) ≤ 1 is guaranteedwhenever β1−β ½1−ðρþ ζÞp≤1. Solving
the inequality with respect to p∗, it yields p≥ 2β−1β
1
ρþζ . If β ≤ 1/2, the
constraint is necessarily satisﬁed, because of the non-negativity of p∗;
the condition must be imposed in the opposite case, i.e., β N 1/2.
Eq. (28) can be used to depict graphically the stability trajectory that
is followed together by the endogenous aggregate variables of the
system. Fig. 2 displays the relation,
Fig. 2 indicates that variables Ω(t) and Φ(t) evolve in opposite
directions as they converge to the steady-state. Under assumption
Ω0 b Ω∗, the share of allocated investment increases following the path
given by Eq. (26); simultaneously, the overall signaling costs of the
whole universe of ﬁrms will fall towards the respective steady-state as
time unfolds.
6. The impact of parameter changes
Two parameters acquire special relevance in the analysis: the
investor's sentiment (B) and the quality of the proposals presented by
the ﬁrms to the investor (qi). These variables have a same qualitative
impact on the value ofΩ∗, since they inﬂuence thematching process be-
tween principal and agent in a similar way.
Proposition 6. A positive change on the investor's sentiment or on the
quality of any of the project proposals will, ceteris paribus, increase the
allocation efﬁciency of the investment, i.e., it will increase the value of
Ω∗, placing it closer to 1.Fig. 2. Saddle-path trajectory for the pair of variables Ω(t), Φ(t).
Fig. 4. Effect of a change on ρ or ζ over p⁎.
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The differentiation of this expression with respect to B or qi yields
∂Ω
∂B
¼ − 1−βð Þζ
1− ρþ βζð Þp½ 2
∂p
∂B
ð29Þ
or
∂Ω
∂qi
¼ − 1−βð Þζ
1− ρþ βζð Þp½ 2
∂p
∂qi
: ð30Þ
Since a general explicit expression for p∗ was not determined, one
cannot derive ∂p

∂B and
∂p
∂qi
explicitly. However, a qualitative evaluation
of the signs of these derivatives is possible. Returning to equilibrium
equality Eq. (11), one observes that a change on B or qi will not exert
inﬂuence over the rhs expression of the equation. Relatively to the lhs,
a positive variation on the value of any of the two parameters will
turn the slope of the respective function more pronounced, making
the lhs and the rhs to intersect at a lower value of p∗, as depicted in Fig. 3.
The ﬁgure reveals that ∂p

∂B b0 and
∂p
∂qi
b0 and, therefore, one concludes
that a positive sentiment change on the quality of any of the projects
presented to the investor will improve the efﬁciency of the resource
allocation: ∂Ω

∂B N0;
∂Ω
∂qi
N0:
Other two parameters have a substantive inﬂuence over the value of
Ω∗. These are the intertemporal discount rate (ρ) and the percentage of
the allocated budget that the investor recovers in each period (ζ). For
these parameters, the following results apply,
Proposition 7. A positive change on the values of parameters ρ and ζ
have a qualitatively ambiguous effect over Ω∗.
Proof. Start by noticing that a positive change on ρ or ζ will imply a
reduction on the steady-state value of the co-state variable. This occurs
because in the relation between the lhs and the rhs of Eq. (11), the ﬁrst
does not suffer any change as a result of varying ρ or ζ, while the rhswill
rotate inward for higher values of each of the two parameters. Fig. 4
clariﬁes this point.
To evaluate the effect that the change in any of the parameters under
consideration exerts on Ω∗, one computes the derivatives of Eq. (17)
with respect to each of the two parameters,
∂Ω
∂ρ
¼ − 1−βð Þζ
1− ρþ βζð Þp½ 2
∂p
∂ρ
þ pð Þ2

 
ð31Þ
∂Ω
∂ζ
¼ − 1−βð Þζ
1− ρþ βζð Þp½ 2
∂p
∂ζ
þ 1−ρp

ζ
p

 
: ð32ÞFig. 3. Effect of a change on B or qi over p⁎.Since the signs of terms ∂p

∂ρ þ ðpÞ
2 and ∂p

∂ζ þ 1−ρp

ζ p
 are not deter-
minable for the general version of the model, one cannot conclude on
the qualitative impact of changes on ρ and ζ over Ω∗.
To illustrate the potential of the DRAP in explaining investment allo-
cation, consider a numerical example. Let β=0.25, ∫i ∈ Nqiβ/(1 − β)di=1,
B= 2, ρ= 0.04, ζ= 0.05.7 For these values, Eq. (11) indicates that the
steady-state level of the co-state variable is, approximately, p∗=0.8279.
Taking Eqs. (17) and (20), one also determines the steady-state of the
aggregate state and control variables: Ω∗ = 0.9675 and Φ∗ = 0.01. In
this case, for the assumed parameter values, 96.75 % of the available
investment resources are effectively allocated, in the long-run, to the
productive activities and, on the aggregate, ﬁrms will need to spend
1 % of the available resources to attain this outcome.
The stable path between Ω(t) and Φ(t) is, following (28), Φ(t) =
0.3085[1− Ω(t)]. The stable trajectory, for the speciﬁc example under
appreciation, is displayed in Fig. 5.
Under the assumptionΩ0 bΩ∗, only the segment 0 ≤Ω(t) ≤ 0.9675, in
Fig. 5, matters. In this segment, a one unit positive change on the aggre-
gate investment share implies a decrease in the value of the aggregate
control variable on an amount 0.3085, as the convergence to the
steady-state takes place.
The example might be employed as well to quantitatively assess the
impact of changes on parameter values and to conﬁrm the general
results presented earlier in this section. Consider ﬁrst a positive change
on the sentiment value, ΔB= 0.05. Recomputing the steady-state level
of the co-state variable, one obtains p(Bnew)∗ =0.8088. Hence, the change
on p∗with origin in the positive sentiment evolution is Δp∗=−0.0191.
Resorting to expression Eq. (17), one veriﬁes thatΩ(Bnew)∗ =0.9683 and,
thus, ΔΩ∗ = 0.0008, i.e., the allocation of resources as improved in 0.8
percentage points.
Consider, in a second moment, a change on the intertemporal
discount rate. Let Δρ=−0.02. In this case, ﬁrms become more patient
in the way they evaluate future outcomes. Now, p(ρnew)∗ = 0.8385. As
discussed earlier, a decrease in ρmust translate on a higher value of the
co-state variable steady-state level; in this case, Δp∗ = 0.0106.
Replacing, in Eq. (17), the new values of ρ and p∗, one obtains the
disturbed steady-state level of the aggregate investment share,
Ω(ρnew)∗ =0.9677. For the assumedparameterization, the negative change
on the discount rate has provoked a slight positive variation onΩ∗,ΔΩ∗=
0.0002;more patience is, in this case, synonymous of an environment ca-
pable of generating a more efﬁcient long-term allocation of resources.7 The values used in the example are adopted with the objective of fulﬁlling two
criteria: to be empirically plausible and to deliver sensible investment allocation and
growth outcomes. Note, however, that some of the parameters are hard to measure and
that they can be presented in different scales, as it is the case of the sentiment index, the
quality of projects or the matching elasticity.
Fig. 5. Illustration of the saddle-path trajectory.
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In this section, the DRAP, as previously examined, is applied to
the standard neoclassical growth model. One builds a Ramsey–Cass–
Koopmans (RCK) optimal control problemwhere the possibility of inef-
ﬁcient investment allocation is considered.
Deﬁnition 4. RCK/DRAP growth model
Consider a representative agent for whom the objective function is
V 0ð Þ ¼ Maxc tð Þ
Z þ∞
0
u c tð Þ½ exp −ρtð Þdt: ð33Þ
In Eq. (33), c(t) ≥ 0 represents consumption and u(.) is the utility
function. The same intertemporal discount rate ρ as for the DRAP
problem is assumed. Optimal control problem (Eq. (33)) is subject to
the capital accumulation constraint
k

tð Þ ¼ f k tð Þð Þ−c tð Þ½ Ω tð Þ−δk tð Þ; k 0ð Þ ¼ k0 given: ð34Þ
Variable k(t) ≥ 0 represents physical capital per unit of labor,
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital and f(k(t)) is the production
function. V(0), in Eq. (33), subject to Eq. (34), is the RCK/DRAP growth
model.
Observe that the single difference between the RCK/DRAP model
and the original formulation of the RCK growth model is the presence
ofΩ(t) in the expression of the resource constraint. Instead of consider-
ing a measure of potential gross investment, which corresponds to the
difference between output, given by the production function, and
consumption, effective gross investment is assumed; this relates to the
potential level times the aggregate investment share Ω(t), a variable
for which the respective dynamics were approached in previous
sections. The remaining share, [f(k(t)) − c(t)][1 − Ω(t)] should be
interpreted as inefﬁcient investment, i.e., investment with zero return,
since, as discussed, it has no productive end.
As it is common in growth models, and in order to facilitate the
analytical exploration of the underlying dynamics, let us consider a
typical constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function,
U½cðtÞ ¼ cðtÞ1−θ−11−θ ; θ ∈ (0, + ∞)\{1}, with 1/θ the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for consumption; assume, as well, a standard Cobb–
Douglas production function, f(k(t)) = Ak(t)α, with A N 0 the state of
technology and α ∈ (0, 1) the output–capital elasticity.
In what follows, the neoclassical growth model is solved for the
effective gross investment version and the main results are discussed.Proposition 8. The optimal trajectory of consumption is, on the
RCK/DRAP growth model, given by equation
c

tð Þ ¼ 1
θ

αAk tð Þ− 1−αð ÞΩ tð Þ−B1= 1−βð Þββ= 1−βð Þ
Z
i∈N
qipi tð Þ½ β= 1−βð Þdi
×
1−Ω tð Þ
Ω tð Þ − ρþ δð Þ þ ζgc tð Þ:
ð35Þ
Proof. The current-value Hamiltonian function of this problem is,
H k tð Þ; c tð Þ; ~p tð Þ½  ¼ c tð Þ
1−θ−1
1−θ
þ ~p tð Þ Ak tð Þα−c tð Þ Ω tð Þ−δk tð Þ  ð36Þ
with ~pðtÞ the co-state variable associated with k(t). First-order
conditions are
∂H
∂c tð Þ ¼ 0⇒ c tð Þ
−θ ¼ ~p tð ÞΩ tð Þ ð37Þ
~p

tð Þ ¼ ρ~p tð Þ− ∂H
∂k tð Þ⇒
~p

tð Þ ¼ ρþ δð Þ~p tð Þ−αA~p tð Þk tð Þ− 1−αð ÞΩ tð Þ
ð38Þ
and the transversality condition,
lim
t→þ∞
~p tð Þexp −ρtð Þk tð Þ ¼ 0: ð39Þ
The differentiation of Eq. (37) with respect to time yields
−θ
c

tð Þ
c tð Þ ¼
~p

tð Þ
~p tð Þ þ
Ω

tð Þ
Ω tð Þ ð40Þ
Growth rate ~p

ðtÞ
~pðtÞ is obtainable from Eq. (38), while
Ω
 ðtÞ
ΩðtÞ corresponds to
the aggregate version of Eq. (4). Replacing these two growth rates in
Eq. (40), the rule of motion for consumption, Eq. (35), is obtained.
Because the DRAP was solved independently of the growth model,
one may assume that the respective stable trajectory is followed,
i.e., according to Proposition 4, pi(t)= p∗. In this case, Eq. (35) simpliﬁes
to
c

tð Þ ¼ 1
θ
αAk tð Þ− 1−αð ÞΩ tð Þ−ζ Ω

1−Ω
:
1−Ω tð Þ
Ω tð Þ − ρþ δð Þ þ ζ
 
c tð Þ: ð41Þ
The dynamic analysis of the RCK/DRAPmodel is feasible through the
evaluation of a three-dimensional system involving the constraint on
capital accumulation, Eq. (34), the consumption differential equation,
Eq. (14), and the differential equation for Ω(t), that one can recover
from Footnote 3.
To proceed, one deﬁnes the steady-state of the RCK/DRAP.
Deﬁnition 5. Steady-state of the RCK/DRAP growth model
The steady-state of the RCK/DRAP is the point
k; c;Ωð Þ ¼ k; c;Ωð Þ :k

tð Þ ¼ 0; c tð Þ ¼ 0;Ω tð Þ ¼ 0
n o
:
Adopting the above deﬁnition, the result in Proposition 9 is
accomplished.
Proposition 9. The steady-state of the neoclassical growth model with
agency relations in the allocation of investment exists and it is unique.
The steady-state values of the capital and of the consumption variables
are, respectively,
k ¼ kP Ωð Þ1= 1−αð Þ; c ¼ cP Ωð Þα= 1−αð Þ
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consumption, i.e., the steady-state levels of the two variables when
there is full efﬁciency in the allocation of investment. The respective
values are,
kP ¼
αA
ρþ δ

 1= 1−αð Þ
; cP ¼
1
α
ρþ 1−α
α
δ

 
αA
ρþ δ

 1= 1−αð Þ
:
Proof. Applying Deﬁnition 5 to differential Eqs. (34) and (41), it yields,
respectively,
c ¼ A kð Þα−δ k

Ω
ð42Þ
k ¼ αAΩ

ρþ δ

 1= 1−αð Þ
: ð43Þ
Result Eq. (43) is the one presented in the proposition for the phys-
ical capital variable. Value c∗ is accomplished by replacing k∗ in Eq. (43)
into Eq. (42),
c ¼ 1
α
ρþ 1−α
α
δ

 
αA
ρþ δ

 1= 1−αð Þ
Ωð Þα= 1−αð Þ: ð44Þ
The graphical inspection of the steady-state result is undertaken via
Fig. 6. In this graphic, it is represented a curve that indicates the position
of the growth model steady-state (k∗, c∗) for every possible value of Ω∗.
One visually conﬁrms that the typical result of the neoclassical growth
model is a particular case of our more complete structure of analysis,
namely the limiting case for which there is a perfect allocation of invest-
ment resources.
The concave shape of the line in Fig. 6 points out that less
than full efﬁciency on investment allocation penalizes relatively more
the capital stock than the level of consumption, in the steady-state.
To address transitional dynamics in the RCK/DRAP, take Eqs. (34),
(41), and the equation for the dynamics of Ω(t). In the vicinity of the
steady-state, a linearized representation of the system under apprecia-
tion will be
k

tð Þ
c

tð Þ
Ω

tð Þ
2
64
3
75 ¼
ρ −Ω δ
k
Ω
−
1−α
θ
ρþ δð Þ c

k
0
1
θ
ρþ δþ ζ
1−Ω

 
c
Ω
0 0 −
ζ
1−Ω
2
666664
3
777775

k tð Þ−k
c tð Þ−c
Ω tð Þ−Ω
2
4
3
5: ð45ÞFig. 6. Steady-state (k⁎, c⁎) for different values of Ω⁎.Matricial system Eq. (45) allows for an assessment of the stability
properties of the growth model.
Proposition 10. The long-term equilibrium of the RCK/DRAP is saddle-
path stable.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of system Eq. (45) possesses three eigen-
values. One of them relates to the investment share and it conﬁrms
the stable nature of the steady-state valueΩ∗ (this is the eigenvalueλ ¼
− ζ1−Ω b0). To evaluate the stability of the growth model, one can
concentrate attention on the sub-matrix of the Jacobian relating to
capital and consumption variables. The eigenvalues of the respective
sub-matrix are such that
λk;c1 λ
k;c
2 ¼ −
1−α
θ
ρþ δð Þ c

k
Ω b 0
λk;c1 þ λk;c2 ¼ ρ N 0:
The product of the eigenvalues, which corresponds to the determi-
nant of the matrix, is negative, while the sum of the eigenvalues,
which is the trace of the Jacobian, takes a positive value. In this case,
therewill be, necessarily, a positive eigenvalue and a negative eigenval-
ue, meaning that, as in the original Ramsey model, a saddle-path stable
equilibrium prevails.
Let us consider the sub-system of Eq. (45) relating variables k(t) and
c(t). Given the relations involving the eigenvalues in the proof of
Proposition 10, the sub-system can be written under the form
k

tð Þ
c

tð Þ
" #
¼
λk;c1 þ λk;c2 −Ω
λk;c1 λ
k;c
2
Ω
0
2
64
3
75 k tð Þ−kc tð Þ−c
 
: ð46Þ
Let λ1k,c be the negative eigenvalue and λ2k,c the positive eigenvalue.
In this case,Ξk;c ¼ ½ Ω

λk;c2
1 0 is the eigenvector associated to the negative
eigenvalue. As a result, the expression of the one-dimensional stable
trajectory in the k(t), c(t) locus is
c tð Þ−c ¼ λ
k;c
2
Ω
k tð Þ−k½ : ð47Þ
The saddle trajectory has a positive slope, meaning that in the ad-
justment from (k0, c0) towards (k∗, c∗), both variables will exhibit a
same qualitative behavior. Again, the full efﬁciency on the allocation
of investment is a particular case of (47), for Ω∗ = 1. Therefore, one
concludes that the more efﬁcient the investment allocation is, the less
steeper the saddle-path trajectory will be. Under strong inefﬁciency, a
small change on the stock of capital will provoke a signiﬁcant change
on the level of consumption, as the adjustment towards the steady-
state unfolds.
Growth dynamics can be graphically evaluated through the
construction of the respective phase diagram. The lines forwhichk

ðtÞ ¼
0 and ċ(t) = 0 are, respectively, cðtÞ−c ¼ λ
k;c
1 þλ
k;c
2
Ω ½kðtÞ−k
 and k(t) =
k∗. Directional arrows in the four quadrants formed by the lines k

ðtÞ ¼
0 and ċ(t) = 0 are determined by the elements in the ﬁrst column of
the matrix in Eq. (46) and point in the same directions as those in the
original Ramsey model phase diagram.8 Fig. 7 represents the phase
diagram forΩ∗ b 1, making the proper comparison with the benchmark
case Ω∗ = 1.
In Fig. 7, one should highlight the difference of position between the
saddle-path for Ω∗ b 1 (S) and the saddle-path for Ω∗=1 (SP). They are
both positively sloped trajectories, but the ﬁrst is necessarily steeper8 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chapter 2.
Fig. 7. Phase diagram for the neoclassical growth model under inefﬁciency on the alloca-
tion of investment.
Fig. 8. Effect of a positive investor's sentiment change on the steady-state levels of physical
capital and consumption.
82 O. Gomes / Economic Modelling 50 (2015) 72–84than the second. The position of the steady-state points, in each of the
two cases, is represented over the steady-state curve drawn in Fig. 6.
One ﬁnal appointment in this section goes to the impact of a
sentiment shock over the dynamics of capital accumulation and con-
sumption. Intuitively, following the result in Proposition 6, according
to which a positive change on the investor's sentiment or conﬁdence
will increase the efﬁciency on the allocation of investment resources
to production tasks, it is clear that an upward movement over the line
represented in Fig. 6 will occur. This is depicted in Fig. 8.
A discrete shock on the investor's sentiment, as one visualizes in
Fig. 8, implies an instantaneous jump from the original steady-state to
the saddle-path that is formedwith the sentiment disturbance. The im-
mediate adjustment takes place on the value of the control variable,
i.e., consumption, and once the new saddle-path is accomplished, both
variables, capital and consumption, will follow this stable trajectory
until the new steady-state point is reached. Note that in this case
there is an instantaneous fall in consumption that comes in the
sequence of the positive sentiment shock, given the position of the sta-
ble trajectory. The consumption level will then increase with capital to
the new steady-state, where both variables will possess higher values
than in the pre-shock situation. The short-run fall in consumption
might be explained under the idea that a better investor's sentiment
implies a reorganization of the productive activity that has its ﬁrst pos-
itive impact over the accumulation of capital, while an increase in the
production of consumption goods will occur only in a long-term
perspective.
The impact of the sentiment change can be quantiﬁed through the
computation of short-run and long-run multipliers. Rewrite system
Eq. (46) with a vector of exogenous coefﬁcients concerning parameter
B,
k

tð Þ
c

tð Þ
" #
¼
λk;c1 þ λk;c2 −Ω
λk;c1 λ
k;c
2
Ω
0
2
64
3
75 k tð Þ−kc tð Þ−c
 
þ
δ
k
Ω
∂Ω
∂B
ρþ δ
θ
c
∂Ω
∂B
2
664
3
775ΔB: ð48Þ
Let Jk,c be the Jacobian matrix in system Eq. (46). Long-run multi-
pliers are,
Δk ∞ð Þ
Δc ∞ð Þ
 
¼ − Jk;c
 	−1 δ k

Ω
∂Ω
∂B
ρþ δ
θ
c
∂Ω
∂B
2
664
3
775ΔB ¼
k
1−α
∂Ω
∂B
δþ 1
1−α

 
k
∂Ω
∂B
2
664
3
775ΔB
ð49Þ
Since ∂Ω

∂B N0 (see Proposition 6), one conﬁrms the graphical result
such that a positive sentiment change generates an increase, in a long-
term perspective, both on the stock of accumulated capital and on the
steady-state level of consumption.
One can also measure the short-run effect over the consumption
variable, since this suffers, in line with what Fig. 8 shows, an initial
jump from the ﬁrst to the second stable trajectory. Assuming that the
shock on B is permanent and non-anticipated, the respective multiplier
is
Δc 0ð Þ ¼ Δc ∞ð Þ−λ
k;c
2
Ω
Δk ∞ð Þ
" #
ΔB
¼ δþ 1
1−α
1−
λk;c2
Ω
 !" #
k
1−α
∂Ω
∂B
ΔB:
ð50Þ
The sign of Eq. (50) is ambiguous. Because the slope of the new
saddle-path, after the positive disturbance on the value of B, diminishes,
consumption may increase or fall immediately after the shock. In Fig. 8,
the consumption level suffers an instantaneous decrease; however,different parameter values could generate the opposite result, leading
to an outcome as the one illustrated in Fig. 9.
8. Endogenous growth under inefﬁcient investment allocation
Consider now an endogenous growth environment,
Deﬁnition 6. AK/DRAP growth model
The problem in Deﬁnition 4 acquires the quality of endogenous
growth model for an output–capital elasticity equal to 1.
Assuming α= 1, the capital accumulation equation is
k

tð Þ ¼ AΩ tð Þ−δ½ k tð Þ−c tð ÞΩ tð Þ; k0 given ð51Þ
and, taking p(t) = p∗, the differential equation for the motion of the
consumption becomes
c

tð Þ ¼ 1
θ
AΩ tð Þ−ζ Ω

1−Ω
:
1−Ω tð Þ
Ω tð Þ − ρþ δð Þ þ ζ
 
c tð Þ: ð52Þ
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Deﬁnition 7. Steady-state in the AK/DRAP model
In the AK/DRAP model, capital and consumption grow at a same
positive rate in the steady-state,γ :¼ k

k ¼ c

c. The ratio between consump-
tion and capital must, thus, be constant in the steady-state: forψðtÞ≡ cðtÞkðtÞ,
the steady-state is such that ψ ¼ fψ :ψ ðtÞ ¼ 0g.
Applying Deﬁnition 7,
Proposition 11. In the steady-state of the AK/DRAP model, the ratio
consumption-capital is the constant value
ψ ¼ θ−1ð Þ AΩ
−δð Þ þ ρ
θΩ
ð53Þ
and capital and consumption grow at rate γ ¼ 1θ ½AΩ−ðρþ δÞ .
Condition ΩN ρþδA is required to guarantee positive long-term endoge-
nous growth.
Proof. Growth rate γ, as displayed in the proposition, can be obtained
directly from Eq. (52). In fact, c

c ¼ 1θ ½AΩ−ðρþ δÞ. The expression of
the differential equation for ratio ψ(t) is obtained by noticing that ψ
 ðtÞ
ψðtÞ ¼
c
 ðtÞ
cðtÞ−
k

ðtÞ
kðtÞ. Such expression is
ψ

tð Þ ¼ 1−θ
θ
AΩ tð Þ−1
θ
ζ
Ω
1−Ω
:
1−Ω tð Þ
Ω tð Þ −
1
θ
ρ−ζð Þ þ θ−1
θ
δþ ψ tð ÞΩ tð Þ
 
ψ tð Þ:
ð54Þ
The evaluation of Eq. (54) in the steady-state delivers the value of
the long-term consumption-capital ratio in the modiﬁed AK model.
The result is value Eq. (53) in the proposition. Note that ψ∗ is necessarily
a positive value given the constraint that also guarantees a positive
long-term growth rate.
Expression Eq. (53) indicates that in the AK/DRAP model, the con-
sumption–capital ratio in the steady-state depends on the value of Ω∗.
Observe that ∂ψ

∂Ω ¼
ðθ−1Þδ−ρ
θðΩÞ2 . We identify two cases,
• if (θ− 1)δ N ρ, then ψ∗ increases with a positive change in Ω∗;
• if (θ− 1)δ b ρ, then ψ∗ decreases with a positive change in Ω∗.
The results point to the intuition that a relatively patient agent (low
ρ)will, in the steady-state, see the consumption level increase relatively
to the capital stock when the efﬁciency on the allocation of theFig. 9. Effect of a positive investor's sentiment change on the steady-state, without con-
sumption undershooting.investment increases, and vice-versa. Fig. 10 illustrates the steady-
state relation between variables Ω(t) and ψ(t).
Relatively to transitional dynamics, note that in the steady-state
vicinity, the AK/DRAP model has correspondence in the following sys-
tem,
ψ

tð Þ
Ω

tð Þ
" #
¼
Ωψ ψð Þ2− θ−1
θ
Aψ þ ζ
θ
1
1−Ωð ÞΩ
0 −
ζ
1−Ω
2
664
3
775 ψ tð Þ−ψΩ tð Þ−Ω
 
: ð55Þ
Eigenvalues are λ1ψ,Ω=Ω∗ψ∗ N 0 and λ
ψ;Ω
2 ¼ − ζ1−Ω b0, and, thus, the
steady-state is saddle-path stable. Observe that the motion of Ω(t) is
independent of ψ(t), what implies that, in the convergence towards
the steady-state, the consumption-capital ratio is chosen such that it re-
mains undisturbed in the steady-state value (ψ(t) = ψ∗), i.e., only the
dynamics of Ω(t), as mentioned in Section 5, matters.
A last remark goes to the effect of a sentiment change over the
steady-state of the AK/DRAP model. Because ΔB N 0 implies ΔΩ∗ N 0, a
positive change on the investor's sentiment triggers a larger steady-
state growth rate for the main economic indicators, i.e., capital and
consumption. The effect of a change on sentiment over the steady-
state growth rate is as much larger as the better is the state of technol-
ogy and the higher is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption. Given that ∂ψ

∂Ω does not have an unequivocal sign one cannot
assert, unambiguously, which is the impact of a sentiment change over
the consumption–capital steady-state ratio.
9. Conclusion
Neoclassical and endogenous growth models offer a compelling
explanation on how the economy accumulates physical capital and on
which is the consumption trajectory in time that maximizes utility.
These models have, as an underlying assumption, the notion that in-
vestment is always allocated efﬁciently and all investment resources
are used in production in every time moment. In such a setting, the
economy is in a position of full employment of resources.
In this paper, one askswhat are the growth implications of assuming
an investment allocation process subject to inefﬁciencies that originate
on an agency relation between a representative investor and a large
number of ﬁrms that compete for ﬁnancial resources to develop their
activities. The investment problem explains how some investment re-
sources are left unused at each time period provoking an inefﬁciency
thatwill certainly inﬂuence the growth process. Assuming inefﬁcient in-
vestment allocation, long-term capital and consumption levels will fall
below the full efﬁciency levels, in the neoclassical model, and the
long-term growth rate will also be lower than in the benchmark case,
when taking the AK endogenous growth model.
The investment allocation problem is designed such that the
investor's sentiment plays a relevant role. Sentiments enter the model
via the matching between resource demand from ﬁrms and resource
supply by the investor. An upgrade in the investor's sentiment will in-
crease the efﬁciency allocation, producing as well a result in terms of
growth outcomes closer to what the original Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans
andAKmodels show. This setting is appropriate to study business cycles
in the environment typically considered by growth theorists: changes
on sentiments provoke changes on growth outcomes.
Future research on the theme of this papermay follow various direc-
tions. Three suggestive paths for further inquiry include an explicit con-
sideration of the dynamics of project quality evolution; the design of a
network of social contact among ﬁrms that may inﬂuence the degree
of optimism or pessimism of the representative investor; and the adap-
tation to an open economy scenario where the representative investor
may choose to invest domestically or abroad, providing different ﬁnanc-
ing conditions for ﬁrms in each location.
A) B)
Fig. 10. Steady-state relation between Ω⁎ and ψ⁎.
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